



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE MARYLAND 20755-6000

1 May 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THROUGH: Office of the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official


SUBJECT: (U) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities, First Quarter, Calendar Year 2018—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//~~FOUO~~) Except as previously reported to you or the President or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any activity conducted under DIRNSA authority, direction, or control during the period ending 31 March 2018 was unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive and, thus, should have been reported pursuant to Section 1.6(c) of Executive Order 12333, as amended. This report summarizes questionable intelligence activities as well as other matters required to be reported to the IOB.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice of counsel.



ROBERT P. STORCH
Inspector General



GLENN S. GERSTELL
General Counsel

(b) (6)

(U) I concur with the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

MICHAEL S. ROGERS
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Encl:
Quarterly Report

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

(U) This document may be declassified and marked "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" upon removal of enclosure(s)


Approved for Release by NSA on 06-17-2019,
FOIA Case # 105767 (litigation)

Classified By: [Redacted]
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20180110
Declassify On: 20430401

Non - Responsive

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**(U) NSA FIRST QUARTER CY2018
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT REPORT**



(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

..... Classified By [redacted]


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
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
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



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f. (U) File Number: NSA 2018-007-Q

Non - Responsive

(1) (U) Incident Description: Provider-caused compliance incident regarding call detail



(b) (1)
(b) (3) -50 USC 3024 (i)
(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36

Records.

~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ On 16 February 2018, NSA technical analysts examining a provider's targeted production of call detail records (CDRs) pursuant to USA FREEDOM ACT, 50 U.S.C. §1861, observed an anomaly [redacted]

[redacted]

At that time, NSA continued to receive the provider's productions, but ceased making new requests and forwarding CDRs produced by the provider to NSA corporate repositories accessible by intelligence analysts. The provider later confirmed some of the records produced contained inaccurate information. Investigation revealed that NSA relied upon some of the inaccurate information in connection with requests to the FISC to

[redacted] the provider stopped the data flow.

- (2) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Timeline:** Date of incident: 16 February 2018
Date incident reported in IRT: 23 February 2018
Date reported to DoD SIOO: 1 May 2018

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Reason for Report:** 50 U.S.C. §1861(b)(2)(C)(ii) limits data that can be sought (and therefore collected) to that pertaining to a "foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, or an agent of a foreign power engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor." While NSA lawfully sought data pertaining to a foreign power engaged in international terrorism, the provider produced inaccurate data and data beyond that which NSA sought.

(4) ~~(TS//SI//NF)~~ **Cause:** NSA continues to work with the provider to understand the scope of this anomaly and remediate this matter: [redacted] the provider's systems populated fields of certain CDRs with inaccurate data, specifically in circumstances in which [redacted]

[redacted] As a result, when some [redacted] CDRs were produced by the provider to NSA, these fields included certain incorrect values.

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Impact on National Security or International Relations:** None.

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Impact on Civil Liberties or Privacy:** The NSA CLPT Office will assess the scope of the civil liberties and privacy impact of this incident upon completion of the investigation.

(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) **Remedial Action:** On or about [redacted] the provider implemented a solution to prevent its production to NSA of any CDRs generated between approximately [redacted] that contain inaccurate information. NSA has initiated the purge process of all data acquired as a result of targeting these [redacted] selectors pursuant to the Orders issued in [redacted]. There is no estimated date of completion at this time. NSA is investigating how to remove other inaccurate CDRs from its system.


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(8) (U/~~FOUO~~) Additional Information: The incident was reported to DoJ on 16 February 2018. DoJ reported the incident to the FISC on 5 March 2018. NSA notified the congressional intelligence committees on 10 April 2018.


Non - Responsive

(9) (U) Status: Open.




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
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
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
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
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